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COMMENTS
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION AS AFFECTED BY THE
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM RULE
The existence of concurrent jurisdiction between the federal
courts and the state courts has been a source of confusion as to
which court has the power to act, and which court should act. The
following statement from the opinion of Chief Justice Taft in
Ponzi v. Fessendent gives an insight as to the nature of this
problem.
We live in the jurisdiction of two sovereignties, each having its own
system of courts to declare and enforce its laws in common territory.
It would be impossible for such courts to fulfill their respective func-
tions without embarrassing conflict unless rules were adopted by them
to avoid it. The people for whose benefit these two systems are main-
tained are deeply interested that each system shall be effective and un-
hindered in its vindication of its laws. The situation requires, there-
fore, not only definite rules fixing the powers of the courts in cases of
jurisdiction over the same persons and things in actual litigation, but
also a spirit of reciprocal comity and mutual assistance to promote due
and orderly procedure.2
A step in the direction of solving the need, as presented by
Chief Justice Taft, has been the adoption of the compulsory coun-
terclaim rule for the federal system of courts.' The purpose of this
Comment is to discuss this rule in conjunction with the principles
of comity, res judicata, and estoppel by judgment as they relate
to problems arising from the existence of this concurrent juris-
diction.4
COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS
Background of Rule 13a
In the normal course of events many suits might be necessary
to finally litigate all of the claims which one party might have
1258 U.S. 254 (1922).
2 Id. at 259.
3 FE R. Crv. P. 13a.
4 For discussion of other problems relating to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13a,
see MooRE, FERMAL PRACTMCE § 13.01-13 (2nd ed. 1948), and Wright, Estoppel By
Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim, 39 IowA L. REv. 255 (1954).
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against another party because any cause of action which is a
potential counterclaim might be asserted by means of an inde-
pendent action.5 To partially alleviate this situation, Rule 13a of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was promulgated to force
the defendant in a suit in the federal courts to assert as a counter-
claim all of his causes of action, which arose from the transaction
which is the basis of the plaintiff's cause of action." The policy
behind the passage of Rule 13a was that upon the failure of the
defendant to so assert these claims as counterclaims7 in the suit,
then the claims would be waived and could not be the basis of any
independent action in the future.'
Rule 13a states as follows:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time
of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if
it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdic-
tion, except that such a claim need not be stated if at the time the action
was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action.9
Construction of Rule 13a
In the construction of this rule two distinctions which previously
had been made have been discarded. First, the rule has been con-
strued to cover legal as well as equitable counterclaims, as was
not the case under the predecessor to Rule 13a, Equity Rule 30. In
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Maloney" the plaintiff by a bill
in equity asked for declaratory relief, and the defendant sought
to assert a legal counterclaim; the court said, "[Ilt is compulsory
on the defendant to plead a legal as well as an equitable counter-
5The right to so assert the cause of action as an independent suit would be subject
to the principle of estoppel by judgment. See discussion pp. 412-15, in/ra.
6 It has been held that the compulsory counterclaim requires no independent juris-
dictional grounds as a basis for its assertion. See Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Lee,
168 F.2d 420 (1st Cir. 1948), and Safeway Store, Inc. v. Dunnell, 172 F.2d 649 (9th
Cir. 1949) (rehearing), cert. denied 337 U.S. 907 (1949).
7 By construction, Rule 13a embraces the actions of set-off and recoupment, thus the
counterclaim would be any claim a party has against an opposing party. See CYCLO-
PEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 16.01 (3rd ed. 1951).
8 PROCEDINGS OF THE AMERIcAN BAR INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL RULES, Cleveland,
p. 247 (1938).
9 FED. R. Cry. P. 13a.
10 3 F.R.D. 341 (E. D. Pa. 1943).
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claim 'if it arises out of a transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim.' "" Second, con-
trary to earlier practices, there now may be a contract counter-
claim in a tort action, and conversely, a tort counterclaim in a con-
tract action. Illustrating this change is the case of Kuensel v. Uni-
versal Carloading and Distributing Co. 2 where the plaintiff sued
for libel and the defendant was allowed to counterclaim for goods
sold and delivered.
Counterclaims Coming Within Rule 13a
If the federal court cannot acquire jurisdiction over persons
who are necessary for the assertion of the defendants cause of
action, then the defendant need not assert his cause of action as
a compulsory counterclaim. Also, the defendant's cause of action
must have matured at the time the plaintiff serves his pleadings."
A third exception is that the defendant's cause of action must not
be the subject matter of a pending cause of action at the time the
plaintiff files his cause of action in the federal court or Rule 13a
will not apply. For example, if B sues A in the state court, and
later A sues B in the federal court on a cause of action which
arose from the same transaction which is the basis of B's action in
the state court, B does not have to assert his cause of action as a
compulsory counterclaim in the federal court.
The following phrase coming within Rule 13a has also caused
much litigation to determine its meaning: ". . . causes of action
arising from the transaction or occurrence that is the subject mat-
ter ...... " Under old Equity Rule 30 this phrase had been con-
strued as including claims logically related, whether they arose
from tort or contract, by the case of Moore v. New York Cotton
Exchange. 4 In this case the defendant's counterclaim was that the
plaintiff had been using the defendant's quotations without the
defendant's permission because the defendant refused to sell his
service to the plaintiff. Here the transaction was a series of events
and not a single transaction. Under Rule 13a no specific defini-
11 Id. at 342.
12 29 F. Supp. 407 (E. D. Pa. 1939).
13 See 3 MooE,, op. cit. supra note 4, § 13.14 (1), for discussion of and exceptions
to this general rule.
14 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
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tion can be given so as to ascertain what cause of action will result
from a given triansaction, let alone give a definite description as to
what is a transaction within the meaning of this rule. However, the
following quotation from Professor Moore gives the interpretation
which has been said to be the better view.
[S]ince the exceptions stated in Rule 13a to the general requirement
of compulsory counterclaims adequately safeguard a party, courts
should give the phrase "transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter" of the suit a broad realistic interpretation in the interest of
avoiding a multiplicity of suits. Subject to the exceptions, any claim
that is logically related to another claim that is being sued on is prop-
erly the basis for a compulsory counterclaim; only claims that are
unrelated or are related, but within the exceptions, need not be
pleaded. 15
PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE OPERATION OF RULE 13a
By use of a hypothetical example the operation of Rule 13a
and problems incident thereto can best be illustrated. Suppose
that a collision occurred in the state of Texas between a car owned
by A, a resident of Oklahoma, and a car owned by B, a resident
of Arkansas. On the basis of diversity of citizenship A sues B in
a federal district court in Texas, alleging the negligence of B and
the resulting physical injuries to A. Subsequently, B sues A in a
state district court in Texas, alleging the negligence of A and the
resulting physical injuries to B.
Two principles must be kept in mind as the problems are pre-
sented. First, although there occurred only a single transaction,
the causes of action of A and B are separate and distinct. And
second, both the federal court and the state court have the power
to acquire jurisdiction over the respective causes of action.
Effect of a Judgment by the Federal Court
Assume that in the hypothetical example B filed his suit in the
state district court after the suit in federal court had gone to judg-
ment, and B did not file his action as a compulsory counterclaim
in the action in the federal court. The problem presented involves
consideration of the judgment of the federal court and the effect
15 3 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 33.
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of the presence of Rule 13a thereon. It should be noted that
neither the old Equity Rule 30 nor the present Rule 13a provide
by their explicit terms for the effect of the failure of the defendant
to present his cause of action as a counterclaim which has been
deemed compulsory. However, under both the Rule 13a and the
old Equity Rule 30 it has been held that the failure to assert a
cause of action before the suit goes to judgment when the rule so
provided was a bar to any future independent suit on this cause
of action.1"
An illustration concerning Rule 13a is the case of Pennsylvania
R. R. Co. v. Mustante-Phillips Inc." where it was held that a
cause of action which should have been a compulsory counterclaim
will be lost if it is not asserted before the judgment is rendered. In
this case the plaintiff sued for freight charges on a shipment which
the defendant refused to accept. On the grounds that the federal
statute covering the plaintiff's liability as a carrier was not appli-
cable, the plaintiff objected to a counterclaim which the defendant
asserted for the negligent handling of the shipment. The reasoning
of the court in allowing the counterclaims was that Rule 13a was
mandatory and that if the court could find any grounds of negli-
gence to allow the asserting of the counterclaim then the court
should allow it, because if the counterclaim was not asserted it
would be lost. Another example of the compulsion behind Rule
13a is Hancock Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co."8 Universal
sued Hancock for alleged patent infringement. Hancock, having
previously filed an answer and counterclaim to the plaintiff's alle-
gations, sought to amend his counterclaim to allege monopolistic
activities by Universal, but the amendment was denied. Although
the amendment was denied, the court stated that the counterclaim
as to the monopolistic activities was compulsory since it arose
from the transaction which was the basis of Universal's action,
and Hancock's answer must contain this allegation as a compul-
sory counterclaim or the right to recover thereon would be lost.
From the discussion of these two cases it is evident that the
federal courts will hold that the cause of action is lost if not
16 American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260 U.S. 360 (1922).
IT 42 F. Supp. 340 (N. D. Cal. 1941).




asserted as a compulsory counterclaim. Therefore, the answer to
the question posed concerning the hypothetical example must be
that the state court cannot act on the cause of action filed there by
B because the cause of action has now been lost. One case so hold-
ing is Jocie Motor Lines v. Johnson.1" Here the lessee of a truck
was involved in a collision. The lessor-owner was sued and he
joined the lessee as a third party defendant. The cases were con-
solidated and the federal district court rendered judgment against
the lesee and the lessor. Subsequently the lessee filed a suit in the
state court against the lessor seeking to have the lessor adjudged
liable for the entire judgment which had been rendered against
them jointly. The case was decided in favor of the lessor and court
stated that this issue of liability should have been raised in the
first suit, but since it was not, the judgment rendered by the fed-
eral district court is res judicata as to this issue. Also, the court
stated that full faith and credit must be given to the judgment of
the federal court.
As pointed out above, the cause of action which was not
asserted as a compulsory counterclaim in the federal court cannot
be asserted in the state court if the federal court has rendered its
judgment first. The reasoning upon which this result has been
reached has varied. Professor Moore has advocated that the rea-
soning should be that the principle of res judicata applies to all
issues which should have been raised during the trial, even though
the issues were not raised.20 A case seeming to follow this reason-
ing is Biaett v. Phoenix Title and Trust Co.21 In this case Laney
brought an interpleader action against Biaett and Phoenix. Biaett
cross-actioned against Phoenix alleging that prior to this suit
Phoenix had instigated an interpleader action against Biaett and
in connection with this suit Biaett had incurred certain expenses
for which Phoenix should pay. Since Arizona has a compulsory
counterclaim rule which is patterned after Rule 13a, the court held
that the cause of action being asserted by Biaett was barred be-
cause it was not asserted as a counterclaim. The principle of res
judicata was held to apply to all issues which should have been
raised, even though they were not.
19 57 S.E. 2d 388 (N. Car. 1950).
203 MooR,, op. cit. supra note 4, § 13.12.
2170 Ariz. 164, 217 P. 2d 923 (1950).
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Another theory is that the cause of action is waived when it is
not asserted as a compulsory counterclaim. The basis of this theory
is that the use of the principle of res judicata creates a fiction
because the cause of action which should have been asserted as a
compulsory counterclaim is not truly an issue of the other cause of
action.22 Thus the waiver theory reasons that if the cause of action
is not asserted as a compulsory counterclaim, then it is waived by
the party not asserting it, and the cause of action so waived cannot
be the basis of any independent action.
The solution to the difficulty in finding sound legal theory for
the result attained (that the judgment of the federal court is a bar
to any action in the state court on a cause of action which should
have been asserted as a compulsory counterclaim, but was not)
might be found in the extension of an idea presented by Professor
Wright in his article on the compulsory counterclaim rule. He
suggests that possibly the principle of res judicata could take on
a new connotation when the effect of the compulsory counterclaim
rule is considered." Since the rule deals with causes of action and
not issues of causes of action, res judicata in this instance would
be a bar to a cause of action which should have been asserted but
was not. It is submitted that the application of this new connota-
tion for res judicata should be considered by the state courts when
they are confronted with this problem.
The result of Rule 13a has been that a rule of procedure estab.
lishing compulsory counterclaims has been the basis for holding
that the state court cannot act on a cause of action which should
have been a compulsory counterclaim in the federal court, when
the federal court has rendered the first judgment. This is an inter-
esting result because a compulsory counterclaim rule, which gen-
erally is binding only in the sphere of the courts to which the par-
ticular rules of procedure apply, has been given extra-territorial
effect. Because the compulsory counterclaim rule defines the
causes of action to which res judicata will apply, this is substantive
law. As such, full faith and credit must be allowed by other states
and other federal courts.2 ' Thus the rule of procedure has given
22 See State ex. rel. Mack v. Scott, 235 S.W.2d 106 (Mo. App. 1950). See also
Wright, op. cit. supra note 4, at 261.
23 Wright, op. cit. supra note 4, at 261.
24 Supra note 19.
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rise to substantive law. The following quotation illustrates the
illogical, but good result.
Can a neater example be imagined of the impossibility of sensible dis-
tinctions between "substance" and "procedure"? Compulsory counter-
claim provisions are enacted as a regulation of "procedure," and in-
deed if, as in most jurisdictions, they have been made by rule of court,
they are valid only as a regulation or "procedure" which must leave
rights of "substance" unimpaired. Yet their effect are held to be extra-
territorial on the explicit grounds that these effects are "sub-
stantive !"26
Effect of an Action Pending in the Federal Court
Returning again to the hypothetical fact situation and assuming
that B files his cause of action in the state court while A's action
in the federal court is still pending, a problem to be considered
is whether the state court can be prohibited from action; and if
not, should it act? The case of Red Top Trucking Co. v. Seaboard
Freight Lines26 answers the question of whether the federal court
can prohibit the state court from acting on B's cause of action
filed there. In this case a suit was filed in the Municipal Court of
New York City alleging negligence on the part of the defendant
in causing a collision. Later the defendant instigated a cause of
action, alleging negligence, in a federal district court in New York
against the plaintiff in the municipal court action. Motion was
made in the federal court to stay the state court action. The motion
was denied for the reason that where an in personam action is filed
in both the state court and the federal court, and the subject matter
is the same in each suit, both suits may proceed at the same time
and the first judgment rendered can be pleaded as a bar in the
other suit. The court further said that to stay the municipal court
action would increase the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a
result which was not intended by the passage of the federal rules
of procedure. For the proposition that the two in personam suits
may proceed concurrently, the court in the Red Top case cited
with approval the case of Kline v. Burke Construction CoY The
Kline case, decided in 1922, was on very similar facts. The con.
25 Wright, op. cit. supra note 4, at 268-69.
20 35 F. Supp. 740 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
27 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
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struction company brought an action in a federal district court
alleging breach of contract against certain officials of Texarkana,
Arkansas. Subsequently, these officials instigated a cause of action
in the Arkansas chancery court against the construction company
and their sureties. The construction company then asked the fed-
eral district court to issue an injunction against the state chancery
court. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court denied the
injunction. The court stated that since the action involved only the
question of personal liability the jurisdiction of the court in which
the first action is filed will not be impaired by allowing the subse-
quent suit because there is no conflict of jurisdiction over a res or
object. Therefore, the court went on to say that a federal court
and a state court may at the same time handle a cause of action
which involves the same subject matter.2" Thus the answer to the
question of whether the federal court may enjoin the state court
must be answered in the negative.
The remaining question is whether the state court in the hypo-
thetical example should act when a cause of action involving the
same subject matter is filed in the federal court prior to the state
action, and the cause of action being asserted in the state court
should have been a compulsory counterclaim in the federal court.
The Kline case and the Red Top case only deal with the question
of power to act, and it is submitted that these cases are authority
for the proposition that both courts may act at the same time, but
not for the proposition that both courts should act at the same
time. In deriving an answer to this question, the following three
points should be considered: the purpose of Rule 13a, the effect
of a judgment which could be rendered by the federal court, and
finally, the principle of comity.
As has been previously stated, the purpose for the passage of
Rule 13a was to prevent multiplicity of lawsuits by restricting the
method by which the causes of action arising from a transaction
or occurrence could be asserted." In the conference where Rule
13a was drafted it was recognized that Rule 13a would not bind
the state courts as such, but the hope was expressed that the state
courts would accept Rule 13a for the purpose for which it was
28 For a recent case reaching this same result see Ermentrout v. Commonwealth
Oil Co., 220 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1955).
29 See discussion pp. 402-3, supra.
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passed. 0 As concerns the federal system of courts the case of
Crosley Corporation v. Hazeltine" held that the assertion of the
cause of action, which should be a compulsory counterclaim, as
grounds for an independent action in another federal court is
grounds for abating the second action.
The state court should also consider the effect of the judgment
which would be rendered by the federal court when it acts. The
judgment rendered by the federal court would be res judicata or
a bar to the cause of action now being asserted in the state court.
As previously discussed," the need for any subsequent action by
the state court would be improbable. Therefore, any action which
the state court would take would lead to an extra lawsuit since the
causes of action will be determined by the judgment in the federal
court, regardless of whether or not the defendant asserts his cause
of action there as a counterclaim.
Finally, the state court should consider the relationship of the
principle of comity to the above stated problems. Briefly stated,
the principle of comity is that the first court, federal or state, to
acquire jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of a
cause of action shall retain this jurisdiction to the exclusion of
any other court until its duty has been performed. 8 Comity seems
to be a principle much discussed but little applied. Nevertheless,
the principle is sound as concerns the avoidance of needless and
hopeless conflict. Comity is usually applied by means of the abate-
ment of the second suit by the second court in which a cause of
action is instigated after a prior cause of action concerning the
same subject matter has already been instigated. The hypothetical
example which has been stated seems to offer a situation where
the principle properly could be applied. After a consideration of
these points it is submitted that the state court should abate the
action in favor of the jurisdiction of the federal court because the
judgment rendered by the federal court will be a bar to the action
pending in the state court.
80 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL RULEs, Cleve-
land, p. 248 (1938).
s1 122 F.2d 925 (3rd Cir. 1941), cert. denied 315 U.S. 813 (1942).
32 See discussion pp. 405-9, supra.
33 Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176 (1884); Gregg v. Winchester, 173 F.2d 512
(9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 847 (1949).
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Two leading cases have reached this result. In Conrad v. West3'
a tenant, due to violation of the rent ceiling pricing, sued his land-
lord in a federal district court seeking to break his lease. Shortly
thereafter, the landlord sued the tenant in a state court alleging
non-payment of rent. The tenant petitioned the state court to abate
the action there in favor of the pending action in the federal court.
The state court abated the action and gave two reasons. First, the
court stated that this situation presented proper grounds for apply-
ing the principle of comity. Second, the action being asserted by
the landlord in the state court should have been the subject of a
compulsory counterclaim in the suit pending in the federal court.
A more recent case is Sparrow v. Milton and Stuart Nerzig 5
In this case a collision occurred in South Carolina between a truck
owned by Sparrow and a car owned by Milton Nerzig and driven
by Stuart Nerzig. Sparrow sued Milton Nerzig in a state court in
South Carolina alleging that the latter was driving negligently at
the time of the collision. Subsequently, Stuart Nerzig filed suit in
a federal court in South Carolina alleging that Sparrow had been
negligent. Sparrow returned to the state court and there moved to
amend his petition to make Stuart Nerzig an additional party de-
fendant and to allege that at the time of the collision Stuart was
driving the car and became jointly and severally liable. The state
court abated the state action as a matter of comity since the action
being asserted in the state court should have been a compulsory
counterclaim in the action pending in the federal court.
PROBLEMS ARISING IF RULE 13a IS DISREGARDED
Returning again to the hypothetical example, problems are
created if the state court in which B has filed his action does not
abate the action but instead acts on the cause of action instigated
by B while the action instigated by A is still pending in the federal
district court. As has been pointed out, the better procedure would
be for the state court to abate the action filed there by B, but it
must be remembered that the state court has the power to act;
34 98 Cal. App. 181, 219 P.2d 477 (1950).
85 89 S.E.2d 718 (S. Car. Sup. 1956).
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therefore the ramifications of a judgment rendered by the state
court should be considered."6
The effect of the judgment will come through the application
of the principle of estoppel by judgment. Estoppel by judgment
means that any issues which were litigated or of necessity liti-
gated8" will be forever settled between the parties and their privies
by the judgment.8" Issues which could have been raised, but were
not, can be raised in a later action.89 Thus in the hypothetical
example, if the state court renders judgment for B on the issue of
negligence, B can introduce this judgment in the federal court and
the issue of negligence between A and B cannot be relitigated in
the cause A vs. B pending in the federal court.4 Thus the effect of
a judgment rendered by the state court would be to preclude any
action by the federal court in the cause of action pending there as
concerns any issues which have been decided by the state court
even though the federal court had acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter first, and the cause being asserted in the state court
should have been a compulsory counterclaim in the federal court.
One question which might be raised is whether the result would
be the same if the state court were a court of limited jurisdic-
tion. 1 A case which fully illustrates the problem and also the rea-
soning which presently has been accepted as the solution is the
case of Foreman v. Massoni.2 This case involves two courts within
Texas, but the principle established has been applied in the area
of concurrent jurisdiction.' The plaintiff instigated a cause of
action in a county court in Texas, which court had a jurisdictional
36 The case of U. S. v. Siliman, 167 F.2d 607 (3rd Cir. 1948), cert. denied 335
U. S. 825 (1948), held that a judgment of a state court must be given full faith and
credit in the federal courts.
37 The term "or of necessity litigated" is meant to be construed as meaning issues
which were uncontested but were necessarily decided in favor of the winning party.
38 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876) ; Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness
Theater Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N. D. Ill. 1952); Gorden v. Gorden, 59 So. 2d 40
(Fla. 1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 878 (1952).
39 Buromin C. v. National Aluminate Corp., 70 F. Supp. 214 (N. D. Del. 1947);
and see cases in note 38 supra.
40 It should be remembered that the negligence case presents the clearest example
of what issues are involved.
41 By the term "court of limited jurisdiction," as used here, is meant that the juris.
diction of the court is limited so that only causes of action within certain money limits
can be brought.
42 176 S.W. 2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref.
4s Cases so holding are Geracy Inc. v. Hoover, 133 F.2d 25 (D. C. Cir. 1942), and
U. S. v. Sillman, note 36 supra.
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limit of $1,000. The defendant tried to cross claim for an amount
above this jurisdictional limit, but this cross-action was dismissed
before the suit was tried. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff.
Subsequently, the defendant in the prior action brought an action
against the plaintiff in the prior action, and the basis of the action
now being asserted was the claim which the defendant attempted
to assert in the first suit. Judgment was rendered for the defend-
ant, who was the plaintiff in the first action. The court held that
the county court had the power to handle all issues within the
jurisdictional limit of the court. Since the same issues were in-
volved in both actions, the prior adjudication of these issues by
the court of limited jurisdiction was conclusive by the application
of the principle of estoppel by judgment when these issues were
presented in the second action. The court concluded its opinion
with an example of the extreme to which this doctrine might extend:
As a result of a collision one party may suffer damages in the sum
of $50,000, the other damages in the sum of not more than $19, a sum
less than the appellate jurisdiction of the County Court. Upon the
principle underlaying the holding we have made in this case a con-
clusive determination of the action for $50,000 might doubtless be
had in the Justice Court. In such a case the public policy which limits
the jurisdiction of the Justic Court to small matters obviously is incon-
sistant with the public policy embodied in the doctrine of estoppel by
judgment, but is not necessarily in conflict therewith. If the defect
requires remedying, recourse must be had to the policy making power
of the State which fixes the jurisdiction of courts. 44
Those who opose the result of the Foreman case contend that
the result is contrary to the purpose for which the courts of limited
jurisdiction were established, i.e., that litigation of smaller claims
could be handled speedily in an inferior court where the rules of
procedure are not as formal as in the other courts. It is asserted
that by the establishment of these inferior courts it was not in-
tended that such inferior courts conclusively decide matters which
require for their adjudication strict procedure and a judge of the
highest qualifications. This inconsistency was recognized in the
Foreman case, as was noted in the quotation in the preceding
paragraph. One possible solution would be a legislative enactment
which would provide that if the defendant cannot assert his coun-
4" 176 S.W. 2d at 368.
[Vol. 10
